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Gendered social movements: A critical comparison of the
suffrage and gay marriage movements
Michelle L Kelsey
Arizona State University
Michelle.Kelsey@asu.edu

The elections of 2008 saw the passage of several overwhelming and explicit
condemnations of gay rights across the nation. Most damaging to the gay
marriage movement was the successful passage of proposition 8 in California,
the first time that the right to gay marriage was repealed. I argue that the
continued modeling of the civil rights framework defers an analysis of
the argumentative strategies of historically gendered movements such as
the suffrage movement and is a disservice to the strategic potential of the
marriage equality movement. The critical comparison made here between
suffrage and marriage equality opens the potential for our foremothers to
teach us to effectively counter gender stereotypes in the pursuit of national
legislative equality.
For decades, GLBT individuals and communities have forwarded a
rights-based campaign seeking political, legislative, and social legitimacy
and equality. While the priorities and goals of the GLBT movement(s)
have changed and shifted over the course of its existence, few issues have
dominated the political thought and thrust of gay and lesbian movements
more than the freedom to marry. A 1993 Hawaiian Supreme Court decision
mandated that the denial of civil marriage licenses to GLBT individuals
ought to be considered sex discrimination; thus sparking a now 15 year old
national campaign both to protect the “sanctity” of marriage, and to realize
complete legislative freedom for gays and lesbians (Cox, 1994; Hovermill,
1994; Keane, 1995; Kramer, 1997; Kersch, 1997).
The election of 2008 saw the passage of several overwhelming and
explicit condemnations of gay rights across the nation. Most damaging to
the gay marriage movement was the successful passing of proposition 8 in
California that repealed the rights of gays and lesbians to legally marry in
that state. The gay marriage movement in 2010 faces the same sorts of rights
roll-back through legislative, judicial, and public proposition measures. In the
face of this resistance and with the determination that marriage equality will
be realized, it is imperative to evaluate the argumentative strategies of the gay
marriage movement as they are articulated in public debate. One persuasive
way in which the rhetorical productions of the gay marriage movement have
proceeded is through the framework of the civil rights movement.
Studies of the civil rights framework are useful and insightful, but they
fall short in the way of explanatory power when it comes to specifically
gender-based arguments forwarded by marriage equality opponents.
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Considering this movement in relation to other particularly gendered
movements reveals a meaningful similarity. The trajectory of the gay marriage
movement is not unlike that of the women’s suffrage movement in the United
States in the late 1800s continuing until the vote was realized in 1920. While
temporally different, the gender specific strategies of the suffragists reflect
in the same sex marriage debate. Any emulation as a strategic tool is worth
investigation. It is the unique character of gender-based movements that
justify the critical comparison made here. Few scholars have archived the
similarities and differences between the same sex marriage movement and
the suffrage movement, surely an endless project. As such, this paper seeks
to understand the similarly gender-based problems faced by both movements
in an attempt to mobilize both theoretical and practical tools to aid in a more
nuanced development of contemporary contestations of gender expectations
particularly in terms of appropriate gender performance for marriage. In an
effort to do so, a review of the gay marriage movement is appropriate.
Literature Review
Initially, Smith (2000) illustrates that the primary arguments in the gay
marriage debate surface in two ways. First, gay marriage advocates speak
about the right to marriage and other rights as civil rights, or as a sanitized
“bundle of right” (p. 23). Second, and alternatively, supporters opposed to
same-sex marriage claim that marriage is “a valuable, indeed necessary,
cultural form central to personal identity and social cohesion” (p. 23). In this
way, marriage as a cultural icon trumps marriage as simply another civil right
to which all are naturally entitled. The chasm between these two arguments
is insurmountable and damaging to marriage equality advocates. Against
the background of the traditional moralistic condition of marriage, a more
hollowed argument about rights is not persuasive to overcome historical
precedence. Nevertheless, there are few persuasive claims to make against
the iconic nature of marriage in the United States that does not reject the
institution altogether, a particularly precarious position for GLBT activists.
Smith points out that there is implicit refutation in arguments for a traditional
understanding of marriage, in so far as the exclusive nature of marriage rights
is grounded in moralistic and theological foundations. In this way, anti-gay
marriage activism limits the strategies available in answering their arguments
while overwhelming a rights-based claim with religious tradition.
Furthermore, Smith (2000) indicates that the persuasive strategies of the
anti-gay marriage supporters are fundamentally more persuasive because of
the focus on the traditional nuclear family. He writes
advocates opposed to gay marriage condense their moral
and cultural arguments into the figure of the “family”
understood as the intact heterosexual, gender rigid,
procreative family. Put simply, the only acceptable
marriage is a “covenant established by God wherein
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one man and one woman, united for life, are licensed by
the state for the purpose of founding and maintaining a
family. (p. 33)
Conclusions such as these work themselves into legislative and electoral
discourse on marriage and produce the current pattern of political loss for
the gay community.
Given this political loss, Smith (2000) offers some alternatives for
same-sex marriage advocates to improve their discursive productions. He
argues that to meet moralistic rhetoric one must engage in moralistic rhetoric.
He suggests that instead of defending homosexuality by examining and
refuting various objections to homosexuals’ relationships, GLBT people
need to articulate strong arguments in favor of homosexual relationships.
This moves the grounds of the debate to an offensive position for gay and
lesbian activists. He further asserts that gay and lesbian activists must stop
relying on rights-based rhetoric to advance their cause; instead they must
begin a rhetoric of judgment and commitment that articulates what material
conditions they are being deprived of and how cultural understanding can
stop their oppression.
Smith’s (2000) suggestion of a ‘rhetoric of judgment and commitment’
is not radically opposed to Jacobs’ (1993) research indicating that victimage
rhetoric may be the most effective mechanism for GLBT advocates to
achieve marriage rights. Jacobs surveys in his article the three primary
persuasive strategies of the gay marriage/gay rights movement: visibility
rhetoric, scourge rhetoric, and victimage rhetoric. Initially, visibility rhetoric
is “rhetoric that declared the existence of gays as a class to the polity” (p. 2).
Jacobs argues that the first initiation of such rhetoric was in the aftermath of
Stonewall. The riots helped to energize GLBT advocates across the country
to engage in political association. The rhetoric that characterized this time
in the movement was primarily comprised of slogans that were to function
as persuasive appeals to create a movement. Those slogans included “say
it loud, gay is proud”, “gay is good”, and “three, five, seven, nine, lesbians
are mighty fine” (p. 4). These slogans were not only a way to bring the
movement together, but also worked to help closeted GLBT persons feel
comfortable coming out.
Visibility rhetoric fizzled out by the 1970s when the rhetoric became
obsolete due to coalesced social movements underway. The mid 1970s saw a
wave of scourge rhetoric employed by the conservative right. The archetypal
enemy of the gay marriage/gay rights movement during this time was Anita
Bryant. Bryant was a former Miss Oklahoma with a singing career who
was also deeply committed to her fundamentalist Baptist beliefs (Jacobs,
p. 32). One element of her particular belief system was the conviction
that homosexuality was wrong, biblically condemned, and an evil to be
legally criminalized. As such, Bryant dedicated herself to opposing gay
rights ordinances all over the country. She is most widely known for her
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opposition to a Dade County, Florida ordinance that would have prohibited
discrimination against GLBT persons in housing and other sectors (p. 33). Her
and other conservative uses of scourge rhetoric took the form of arguments
best epitomized by her statement, “why does such an abomination to God
as homosexuality exist? It’s Satan on the move” (p. 34).
Scourge rhetoric, at its heart, was moral, medical, and debasing rhetoric
with the specific purpose of demonizing homosexuals. More specifically,
the religious right used tactics that located homosexuals as villains intent
on corrupting the American moral system. Bryant and her colleagues
used strategies that cast homosexuals as child molesters at worst; at best,
homosexuals were attempting to recruit young children to their ranks due
to inability to procreate naturally. Furthermore, Bryant’s claims that she
and others must save their children from the moral depravity that was
homosexuality resonated strongly to an audience that had grown tired of the
radical movements of the 1960s. According to Jacobs (1993), over 72% of
Americans reported their disapproval of homosexuality directly following the
assault of scourge rhetoric intermittent through out referendum campaigns.
This strategy is exceedingly effective for anti-gay advocates because it is a
direct answer to visibility rhetoric and the mantras the 1960s. The argument
that gay is bad, a moral disease, and homosexuals want to recruit children
overwhelms rapidly the argument “gay is good”.
The gay marriage/rights debate alternative here is to answer the
arguments in largely religious terms. The movement at the time was not
well equipped to do so. In this case, the gay rights movement maintained
the ‘gay is good’ arguments. In an attempt to counter the recruiting and child
molestation charges, the gay rights movement responded that it was unfair to
let gay children believe that they are alone or evil. Unfortunately making the
move rhetorically to address childhood sexuality was the wrong one. For a
culture that already believes that sex talk is taboo, focusing on the sexuality
of children reinforced the stereotypes of homosexuals recruiting and turning
children into homosexuals. This strategy set back the movement at least five
years according to Jacobs (p. 39).
In the 1980s the gay rights movement experienced an unlikely opening
through which they could gain a substantial amount of ground they had lost
in the 1970s. The Reagan administration published a surprising report that
indicated that GLBT people experienced more hate crimes than African
Americans, Jews, and Hispanics combined. The news media surrounding
presidential reports not only increased the visibility of homosexuals, but also
garnered the movement sympathy across the nation (Jacobs, p. 42). Not only
was the report released from one of the least gay friendly presidents in the
recent past, the report allowed the gay rights group to frame arguments in
an entirely new manner. Jacobs argues that because GLBT identified people
were experiencing physical crime that was recognized nationally, they could
now articulate arguments in terms of tolerance instead of acceptance. Instead
98

of asking the American public to accept them, they could ask the American
public to protect their basic right to safety that would get their foot in the
door for further legal reform. Jacobs argues that this by far was the most
successful persuasive strategy of the gay rights movement.
Given the success of victim rhetoric, it is Jacobs’ conclusion that the
movement employs more of this rhetoric in the fight for equality. Jacobs
(1993) contends that as homosexuals continue to secure minor rights to
material safety they are increasing the legal acceptance of homosexuals as
equal citizens. When homosexuals are recognized as equal citizens, denying
them civil rights is less plausible. Furthermore, Jacobs argues that the GLBT
movement must narrow their arguments into more nuanced positions with
multiple options for articulation. Jacobs points out that the more nuanced
the argument the more persuasive, and the more difficult it will be for the
anti-gay activists to answer without having to spend time defending their
own position.
Jacobs (1993) is one of many authors that advocate that the gay marriage
movement/gay rights movement develop more nuanced, precise arguments
to attempt to answer those forwarded by the opposition but also to generate
offensive arguments that advance them in the debate. Smith and Windes
(1997) explain that there are multiple sites of struggle in the debate over gay
marriage. These sites are troubling because they demand each side address a
number of issues and arguments simultaneously while finding innovative and
specific answers. There are five arguments identified by Smith and Windes
that warrant analysis. The first is the debate over a “culture war” (p. 37). The
anti-gay marriage movement has the advantage when defining the gay marriage
struggle as a culture war. Arguments in favor of gay marriage are minor and
largely negative in this context. Those who oppose marriage equality or gay
rights more generally maintain the debate as a culture war wherein gay and
lesbian activists wage war on mainstream culture forcing the average citizen to
accept their ‘perversion’. In this way, gay and lesbian claims to equality were
not palatable against a fear of societal disaccord and depravity.
The argument against same-sex marriage here is that homosexual
advocacy is by its nature an attack on culture. Homosexuals are subversive
and deserve to be marginalized in this view. This exploits for persuasive
purposes the already marginalized status of GLBT people. It reinforces and
reminds the listeners that GLBT people are already not equal in the status
quo for a reason. Ultimately, culture is a contested ground in the antigay
debate but not in the marriage equality debate. Smith and Windes (1997)
argue that this differential is a partial explanation as to why gay marriage
advocates continue to lose debates; behind because of their marginalized
status, gay marriage advocates are not adequately addressing the arguments
forwarded by their opponents.
The next argument articulated by Smith and Windes (1997) that appears
in the gay marriage debate is “totalitarianism” (p. 37). Both sides of the
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gay marriage debate accuse each other of being Nazis. Marriage equality
advocates argue that those opposed to same-sex marriage are Nazis because
they demand no deviations from the norm, and expect a blind following.
Anti-gay advocates point to homosexuals as an integral part of the Nazi
party and often brand them with pink swastikas. Overall, the deployment
of the term Nazi immediately calls into question legitimate state power.
This argument fundamentally questions the level to which the government
can be manipulated to promote the interest of the minority. As a result the
argument for free expression was developed by gay marriage activists.
Shortly after, the anti-gay advocates co-opted the argument stating that they
have the constitutional right to freedom of religious expression which we
as Americans have decided is more persuasive than rights-based claims of
free expression.
The third type of argument discussed by Smith and Windes (1997) is
“ideograph rights” (p. 37). According to the authors, “the pro-gay movement
labels their demands as ‘gay rights’” because it would be understood to
include legal protection against discrimination (p. 38). The antigay movement
labels these rights “special rights” that infringe on majority rights. Further,
they argue that homosexual behavior implicitly disqualifies claims to legal
protection and does not deserve freedom. The equivocation here is murder or
rape; as perverted acts, they do not deserve protection under the law (p. 38).
Despite the failure of civil rights discourse in the case of the gay rights
movement, Smith and Windes (2000) suggest that within this argument
rights-based claims have the most potential to be successful because the
arguments would echo the civil rights movement rhetoric that was successful.
Alternatively, they argue that those opposed to gay rights in this context are
likely to be successful as well. Anti-gay rights arguments are persuasive
because they can emphasize equality (no special rights) and counter one
set of rights claims with another. These persuasive appeals in contemporary
debate would be reminiscent of the affirmative action debates, quotas, and
reverse racism. It appears, then, that the most persuasive strategies still lie
on the side of the anti-gay marriage debate.
In addition to rights claims, both sides of the gay marriage debate
also attempt to cast themselves as anti-establishment. Anti-establishment
claims, according Smith and Windes (2000), should ideally aid gay
marriage advocates, as they are in fact the numeric minority in the debate.
Unfortunately, however, the anti-gay marriage activists win here as well.
Specifically, arguments in favor of gay rights include attempts to “modify a
society dominated by capitalism, patriarchy, heterosexism, homophobia, and
religiosity,” (p. 40). As one of these ideologies is identified as problematic,
dominant, or oppressive it demands a fundamental restructuring of that
system. Alternatively, argument against same-sex marriage make clear that
they are fighting against “the establishment, dominated by elite secular
humanists” who they claim have control over television, journalism, print
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media, and other forms of cultural communication (p. 40). Both groups
attempt to create the other as the establishment and direct their persuasive
strategies in that way. Given historical and contemporary stereotypes of
homosexuals, the ability of the antigay marriage side to cast homosexuals
as trying to invade their culture and recruit people to their ranks resonates
particularly strongly with average Americans. So, despite the fact that
approximately 5% of the population in American is likely gay they are seen
as aggressively in control. To find this argument in public debates, one need
look no further than September 2009, when a Republican senator from Iowa
claimed on the Rush Limbaugh show that gay and lesbian activists have
“bought off the media, and congressional representatives” to enforce and
protect a “gay agenda”.
Most contemporary gay marriage supporters are at a stand still in terms
of negotiating a public discourse surrounding the issue. While many states
have passed then overturned, and then passed again GLBT rights to marriage
there is no national recognition of or protection for state recognized same
sex marriage or civil unions. My attempt in this paper is not to deny the
important progress made in the way of securing marriage rights for GLBT
individuals, or to ignore the work of activists in this fight. My hope in
exploring this literature and drawing the comparisons between particularly
gendered movements is to find a way for GLBT activists and individuals to
articulate more accurately responsive claims against aggressively traditional
gender-biased arguments. As is illustrated above, those interested in the
arguments made by the gay marriage and anti-gay marriage movements
have not explored the gendered questions that are necessary to answer before
either side is on the same ground. To find this common ground and to begin
the analysis of these two movements, a turn to the structure and operation
of the suffrage movement arguments is necessary.
Framework
Aileen Kraditor (1965) categorizes types of arguments made in the
suffrage movement in terms of their content, and implication for the
movement. She outlines two primary argument types: arguments from justice
and arguments from expediency. Arguments from justice demand the right
to suffrage based on women’s shared humanity with men. Because men
and women are both citizens and share the right to natural rights protection,
arguments from justice say women should have the natural right to vote.
Kraditor explains that arguments from expediency negotiate the
meaning of rights, or rights-based claims. Arguments from expediency
require that the arguer make offensive claims in demand for rights that in so
doing also describe the way in which the attainment of those rights would
improve society. In this way, women made arguments from expediency
that indicated the kinds of change that their vote could affect. For example,
Elizabeth Cady Stanton in a speech delivered in 1904 argued that women
Kaleidoscope: Vol. 8, 2009: Kelsey

101

should have the right to vote because their vote could reform the nature
of corrupt, overzealous male politicians that were selfishly controlling the
polity (Kraditor, p. 47-48).
Kraditor (1965) indicates that the early demands of the suffrage
movement were primarily characterized by arguments from justice (p.
44). This is consistent with the history of early America. A relatively new
America was forged based on individual freedom, natural rights, and civic
participation. Under the tide of this political freedom, claims to natural
rights and a common humanity played into the genre of arguments made by
the founders of new male freedom. Women in many states originally had
the right to vote, and those rights were slowly but steadily being repealed.
Demands for equality on the grounds of natural rights, then, in the face of
rights depravation seemed the most persuasive. This strategy changed at the
turn of the 20th Century after all women in all states were deprived the right
to vote. The question of why this change occurred seems irresolvable in the
literature; however, a common explanation indicates that the introduction,
or at least the increased concern about race issues as they intersected with
women’s suffrage, changed the way that white women in particular articulated
socially imperative reasons why they should have the right to vote (Kraditor,
p. 52-53).
Because there was overwhelming fear that suffrage granted to women
would mean suffrage for African American women as well, white women at
the time changed their strategy to increase the distinction between themselves
and African American women. This strategy initiated claims of citizenship,
productivity, and public morality. Because white women were responsible
for the moral rearing of young congressmen, they claimed they needed the
right to vote. This argument from expediency illustrates how women had to
articulate arguments and characterizations of how the vote granted to women
would positively impact social mores and relationships.
These two nuanced distinctions will be used as a framework for
evaluating the political and social viability of the gender based arguments
forwarded by both the suffrage movement as well as the gay marriage
movement. This however is not enough to articulate just how similar or
different arguments forwarded both for and against each movement truly
were and what the implications of those similarities or differences may be
for the gay marriage movement. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (1989) illustrates
three primary arguments forwarded against suffragists during the movement:
theology, biology, and sociology (p. 37). Theological arguments were the
most fundamental to the suffrage arguments in as much as they indicted the
appropriate, moral character of women. The argument was that God has a
distinctive plan and place for women in the home to maintain the family
unit (Campbell, p. 37). Deviations from this plan were not only sins, but
ultimately immoral. As such, the performance of femininity in this context
became a moral imperative. The second set of arguments forwarded against
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suffragists was arguments from biology. These arguments were constructed
on biological differences between the sexes assuming male superiority. So
the argument looked something like: women had smaller brains and as such
were the weaker sex and not fit for the responsibilities of voting. This line
of argumentation further reasoned that women by virtue of their femaleness
were naturally conditioned to be subservient, passive, and caretakers. The
last argument made against suffragists was from sociology. Sociological
arguments were predicated on the notion that women were part of a distinct
social group, the family, and their job was to maintain that social unit.
All three arguments are interconnected; as such, the arguments grow
slightly more complicated than the examples given above. It is because of
the nuanced nature of how gender-based arguments can be made and justified
that this framework for comparisons between the suffrage movement and the
gay marriage movement is necessary. Few arguments in the public sphere are
rooted so thoroughly in tradition, intolerance, and ignorance than questions
of gender and expected and appropriate gender performance for both men
and women.
Analysis
What follows is an analysis of the arguments articulated against the
suffrage movements and their relationship to the arguments forwarded against
marriage equality, each movements responses, followed by a close reading
of the important differences between the movements. The structure reflects
both Kraditor’s (1965) argumentative priorities as well as Campbell’s (1989)
organization of content-based arguments.
Oppositional Arguments from Expediency
Biological/Theological. Foundational to the opposition of suffrage
was the indictment on biological terms that women are by nature inferior
to men. While this is fundamentally a biological argument, it is inextricable
in this case from theological arguments concerning the appropriate role
of women. Men and women opposed to suffrage were aggressive and
successful at characterizing women as “rejecting their feminine nature,
being freaks, counterfeit men, monstrosities of nature, unsexed and
oversexed simultaneously, self-absorbed, and belittling the hard work of
other domestic women” (Marshall, 1997, p. 132). Naturally, these arguments
were contextualized in relation to men and masculinity in so far as the
rejection of femininity directly threatened male masculinity. Women, at
the divestiture of their femininity, transformed marriage from a religious
sacrament to a partnership between two equals (Marshall, p. 138). This
equalization of marriage participants crowds out male responsibility for
familial care. Deposition of male power as head of the household ignites
threats of male reversion to barbarianism and a regression from chivalry
(discussed in detail below). This indictment of women and who they become
Kaleidoscope: Vol. 8, 2009: Kelsey
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through activism and ultimately their right to vote is the core of the antisuffrage movement strategies. Marshall indicates that these arguments were
typically contextualized to specific situations, but indictments of a woman’s
true femininity were almost always cast in terms of how the traditional role
of men was displaced (p. 138). Taking this argument a step further, and
turning to theological justification, many argued that the natural condition of
women is subservience demonstrated in the Christian origin story of Adam
and Eve, and well as countless other social positions of women articulated in
biblical narratives. This positions anti-suffragists to argue that the rejection
of femininity is unnatural through biblical condemnation.
Mismatched gender performances as a threat to traditionally understood
roles in both marriage and the family is not lost in the gay marriage debates. In
fact, GLBT individuals struggle most in shoring up support for gay marriage
because of the strategies used by those opposed to gay marriage to characterize
all GLBT individuals as gender confused and clinically so. Those opposed to
marriage equality argue that both gay men and lesbians enact, in extremes,
gender oppositional performances. Both gay men and lesbians are cast in
incongruent stereotypes of GLBT individuals and women simultaneously.
Specifically, gay men are cast in two opposing ways in the gay marriage
debate. As discussed previously, gay men are most often characterized as
hypermasculine, aggressors, savage, hedonistic, and predatory. When that
stereotype does not fit the situation, gay men are otherwise stereotyped
feminine, or overly effeminate. Here, they simply become women (Herman,
1997, p. 80). Alternatively, lesbians are either hypermasculine or they are
victims. Lesbians first get defined as attempting to be men. In this sense,
they also become aggressors, dangerous, and unnatural. They dress like, act
like, and sound like men (Herman, p. 94).
If lesbians are not attempting to be men, according to those opposed to
gay marriage, their homosexuality can be attributed to emotional and sexual
abuse and imbalance. Marshall (1997) indicates that anti-gay marriage
advocates believe that lesbians are such because men have molested them,
or their mothers have molested them, or gay men have corrupted them, or
there was not a fulfillment of maternal needs while they were children.
The strategic positioning of lesbians in this context is not incidental; in any
case, women are not agents except when they are failing mothers. Men are
characterized as predatory, both gay and straight. This reinforcement of
traditional gender roles undercuts the viability of lesbians to make credible
arguments in the gay marriage debate. This too is not an accident, as both
Herman (1997) and Sullivan articulate, lesbians may be the biggest asset
to the movement. Sullivan uses lesbian commitment, monogamy, and child
rearing, as examples of how gay and lesbian relationships can be both healthy
and non-threatening to heterosexual relationships. Herman indicates that
opposition to lesbianism is relatively benign and as such lesbians could be a
powerful political asset in arguments for gay marriage/rights (p. 108). Both
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of these arguments, however, generate their own set of gendered assumptions
that will be addressed in the implications section below.
Sociological. Initially, anti-suffragists labeled those in support of the
right to vote “aggressors.” Primarily, these women were characterized as
preying on a democratic society. This argument accused women of demanding
“extra rights” as citizens of the United States (Marshall, 1997, p. 98). Suffrage
here is illustrated as an aggressive campaign imposed upon the polity by a
select few women who lost their sense of place in the social order. A pamphlet
released in California following a significant victory for suffrage headlined:
“Should all women bear the burden of the ballot to give some women political
prominence?” (Marshall, p. 98-99). While an explicit extra rights claim here
is apparent, it is the enthymematic power of this argument that ultimately
gives it weight. What is not said in this argument but is implicitly inferred is
that women would be burdened by the extra responsibility of having a voice
in their political and social lives, which seems to necessarily imply their
weakness. Further, it implies the elitism of a few women over the greater
good of society. This description is powerful in as much as it negates the
nature of being a proper woman. The attributes of true womanhood (later
termed the Cult of True Womanhood) demand that women be pious, pure,
generous, domestic, dependent, submissive, as well as giving, and selfless in
deference to the needs of her family (Welter, 1977). Any violation of these
values violated gendered norms and performance expectations. The claim
that women in the movement were elitist and demanding “special rights” was
more than just a reflection of modern day anti-affirmative action arguments,
but instead was an unspoken assault on the femininity and womanhood of
suffragists.
In much the same vein, opponents of same sex marriage use the same
label of “aggressor” and while some of the implications of this label are
the same as the suffrage movement, some are distinctly and devastatingly
different. An aggressor in its most benign sense in the gay marriage debate
characterizes GLBT individuals as desiring extra rights or special rights.
This argument is not uncommon as illustrated by the suffrage movement,
the civil rights movement, and in any debates concerning affirmative
action (Herman, p. 76). This claim to special rights, though, is wrapped
up in the rhetorical power of the term “aggressor” when it comes to GLBT
individuals. Historically, according to Herman, gay men in particular have
been characterized as “hyper-masculinity out of control, aggressive, powerful,
unrestrained, and predatory” despite the common assumption that gay
men are gendered effeminate (p. 79-80). Specifically, gay men are not just
predators of other gay men, they are particularly threatening to straight men,
and young boys as well (Sullivan, 2007). In this context, gay men become
predators of people not just ideologies, or democracy as was the case for
suffragists. More importantly perhaps for the gender analysis here, they
become predators of masculinity. Gay men are in a perpetual state of nonKaleidoscope: Vol. 8, 2009: Kelsey
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masculinity. Either they are hyper-masculinzed as illustrated above, or, they
are feminized to the point that their masculinity is unrecognizable (Herman,
p. 80-81). This strategic juxtaposition makes the attainment of masculinity
impossible while also maintaining a “healthy” view of masculinity that is free
from any threat or implication of homosexuality. In this sense then, the gay
male as aggressor is not just about rights-based due, or material predatory
concerns, but also about the protection of masculinity and the appropriate
performance thereof.
An additional content-based argument forwarded by anti-suffragists was
women as radicals. This is intimately connected to women as predators in
the sense that females were characterized as being associated with evil and
dangerous sources (Marshall, p. 100). The strategy of this label was to associate
activist women with groups of people that were decidedly threatening to socials
mores, the democratic process, or threatened the power of the country such
as socialists, anarchists, atheists, and radical labor movements (p. 100). This
enabled anti-suffragists to generate a public sentiment against suffragists based
on no facts, but instead to depend on already established fears of political and
social instability due to external forces. These ideological associations between
suffragists and socialists, atheists, etc. also functioned to insult the femininity
of the women participating in the suffrage movements. Campbell (1989)
explains that if women were to meet the minimum requirements of being a
true woman, they have to be submissive to their husbands (imitation of men),
as well as be the spiritual mainstay of the family. If suffragists are associated
with external evil forces such as atheists and other radical groups they are
presumably not deferring to their husbands moderate or conservative views.
Equally important is the rejection of religion, and the democratic process. If
suffragists were willing to associate with socialists and atheists, it calls into
question the capacity for those women to be the feminine mothers to which
their gender is obligated.
GLBT individuals are not strangers to the ‘radical’ label. Specifically in
gay marriage debates radical has become a euphemism for Nazi (Herman,
p. 90-91). Herman explains that gay marriage supporters were labeled
radicals (Nazis) to characterize the movement as power hungry totalitarians
forcing their homosexuality onto mainstream culture. This picture of GLBT
individuals, it is worth noting, is incongruent with the anarchic savages
in arguments that depict gay men as aggressors. Of course, however, the
hyper-masculinity is emulated in the militaristic metaphor associated
with totalitarianism. This rhetorical strategy is mutually reinforcing. It
associates Nazis with GLBT individuals signifying the foundationally
corrupt and diseased ideas of Nazism while simultaneously signifying
GLBT individuals with a historically saturated view of conquest and world
domination (Herman, p. 91). This rhetorical move does a little more than
just associate the gay marriage movement with totalitarian Nazism; the
choice to hail the Holocaust in relation to GLBT individuals is powerful
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in erasing historical memory of the gay men and lesbians that were also
systematically killed in concentration camps by virtue of their sexuality.
Herman does not acknowledge this particular problem with calling on the
Nazi descriptor; however, there is little arguing that associating GLBT
individuals with Nazis does cultural work to highlight the differences
that were the grounds for the extermination of GLBT individuals during
the Holocaust. In this way, mainstream culture can fight Nazis or GLBT
individuals; in either case, gay marriage activists lose.
For the suffrage movement, moving away from abstract labels such as
aggressor or Nazi was a social imperative to articulate an immediate threat
from suffragists. Anti-suffragists sought to paint women as irresponsible,
dangerous, and bad mothers by indicting their commitment to the family. The
argument that women were ignoring their responsibility to the family was
both persuasive and gendered. Marshall (1997) argues that anti-suffragists’
arguments concerning the family attacked the presumed division of labor:
“men protect women and the family on the battlefield and in politics, while
women preserve the family at home” (Marshall, p. 109). The act of seeking
suffrage itself withdrew the woman from her appropriate place in the home,
it was argued, and any successful result of the movement would cement
such a condition. Anti-suffragists argued that the right to vote would move
women out of the home and into the corrupt location of social and political
debates (Claflin, 1871). Suffragists faced a litany of attacks in this respect
including: “starting sex wars, marital discord, domestic neglect, rampant
individualism, disunity, rivalry, and strife” (Marshall, p. 121).
While the argument that women moving out of their domestic position
would undermine the family is gendered, a more in-depth understanding
of how women and men were strategically positioned in these arguments
reveals that the primary concern was the risk the movement posed to role
of men and masculinity. Campbell illustrates the arguments were typically
characterized by male power. The family was likened to the state, and the
man as the head of his own government. For women to break out of their
domesticity men would have to surrender their leadership of the family state
to women. Women alternatively were characterized in this context as overtly
aggressive and power hungry to dominate men and the family (Campbell,
p. 157). Furthermore, suffragists as responsible for sex wars hailed both a
metaphor for violence, but also a serious threat of material violence. Marshall
indicates that in this argument men and women opposed to suffrage argued
that female dominance would lead to a regression from chivalry and into a
sort of barbarianism. Men argued “we have put women on a pedestal… they
will fall” (Marshall, p. 123). This argument culminated in a threat that the
sight of women voting would excite the sexual brutality of men leading to
uncontrollable rape and assault.
While threats of physical violence and their realization have often been
the subtext of many arguments concerning the equalizing of power relations,
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(see civil rights movement, Chicano rights movement, feminist movements,
etc.) these arguments are particularly underscored in the context of genderbased arguments (Marshall, p. 123). Threats and actualized violence continue
to be an undercurrent in the debate over same-sex marriage particularly
when it comes to the corruption of the family by gay marriage. The most
predominate argument from those who oppose marriage equality is borne
out of the notion that marriage is for procreation. At the most fundamental
level, GLBT individuals threaten the family because two same sex partners
cannot naturally produce a family (Rauch, 1996).
This is not where “the assault on the family” argument ends. Sullivan
illustrates that GLBT individuals are also characterized as emotionally
inept, promiscuous, and lack the restraint to be monogamous. These
qualities, as per traditionalists, are a basic requirement for healthy families.
It is important to note that lesbians endure far less scrutiny in terms of
family based arguments. ‘Lesbians as mothers’ does not necessarily violate
traditional female gender roles: women are meant to care for children. As
such, the Christian Right defers to the public/private distinction when it
comes to the question of lesbian mothers (Herman, p. 107-108). Mothering
and other issues of domesticity have historically been secluded to the
private realm, while issues such as political rights are considered public
realm issues. This separation has strategically marginalized important issues
surrounding female security and rights in the home. Issues like marital
rape, domestic abuse and the like have been chalked up to private issues
to be negotiated by the family. The position this puts lesbians in, then, is
of invisibility in the debate. This nuanced distinction between assumed
parenting desires and capabilities not only highlights inconsistencies in
the anti-gay marriage movement but also spotlights the gendered nature
of many of their arguments. The reversion back to a public/private
dichotomy has additional implications that are given greater attention in
detail below.
Movement answers
As illustrated to this point, the suffragists and marriage equality
advocates endured similar onslaughts of arguments that sought/seek to
characterize activists as dangerous, unnatural, and risky social actors that
threaten the normal functioning of the polity. While it is imperative to
understand thoroughly the sorts and substance of arguments articulated
against each of these movements, another key element in any discussion
of social movements and their effectiveness is an understanding of the
movements’ responses to accusations. Just as there was overwhelming overlap
in the way of arguments made against each movement, their responses and/
or potential responses are equally similar.
Argument from Justice. Suffragists claimed that they deserved equal
rights due to the natural rights guaranteed them as humans. They reasoned
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that if men and women share humanity and natural rights, then women
too should have the right to vote secured. Though this strategy grows less
effective in the gay marriage debate, those that support marriage equality
make arguments from justice by mobilizing historical civil rights fights for
equality including miscegenation, and desegregation. In the proposition 8
debate in California, many “no on 8” commercials sought to couch their
arguments for gay marriage in the images, rhetoric, and history of a civil
rights movement that made primarily arguments from justice. To recognize
the common humanity of those who are gay and those who are not is to
recognize that equal rights is a cultural/democratic imperative.
Arguments from Expedience
The turn to making offensive claims about the social utility of the
right to vote or the right to marry complicates the grounds from which
arguments are articulated and the strategic utility of some arguments. Both
movements are put in a double-bind from their social/political locations in
a democratic society. They are socially positioned outside of mainstream
culture so must both criticize that culture and seek its entrance. In this
way, the movement activists in both cases attack the people that must act
for their liberation.
Biological/Theological. As the turn of the century passed suffragists
began a new wave of expedience arguments that capitalized on the xenophobia
and religious intolerance of the time arguing that if women were given the
vote it would offset the vote of foreigners and Catholics (Kraditor, p. 55). In
this sense then, the assumption of the female vote was that it would emulate
the vote of their husbands or the interests of common public morality that
was presumably differentiated from that of foreigners or Catholics. This
continues an implicit subservience to male power and opinion (Kraditor,
p. 56). Generally, arguments from expedience, in the case of suffrage, meant
the reinforcement of traditional gendered stereotypes of women in an effort
to increase their freedom.
Sociological. Female ties to domesticity and the home created the
conditions under which the women of the suffrage movement made
arguments that capitalized on stereotypes while also advancing their rights.
For example, women argued that they needed the right to vote because they
were responsible for the training of young men who would later become
statesmen and as such need the right to influence, politically, the home and
men. On a macro level, this argument was that if women were responsible
for the raising of statesmen, then they were also responsible for any failings
of the state and as such should have the right to vote (Kraditor, p. 52). While
this argument puts women in the position to bear the responsibility of a failed
political system, it is also an effective offensive argument for suffrage.
Just as suffragists were dependent on their marginalized status to make
arguments, GLBT individuals are also strapped to their position in the social
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hierarchy. One argument from expediency indicates that gay marriage will
help to domesticate gay male promiscuity (Bruce, 2004). According to Bruce,
many argue that gay men are disease spreading hyper-sexed polygamous
individuals who pose a threat to society as such. His proposition, then, is
that marriage may be a sufficient solution to this particular social threat. He
also indicates that it would do well for gay men and lesbians if the picture
of homosexuality was not one of mass promiscuity and hyper-sexed men.
This argument of course is only possible because the initial stereotype of
the oversexed, diseased gay male exists. Furthermore, this argument asks
gay people to emulate straight relationships. The assumption that women
domesticate men is predicated on traditional gender roles, that is clear;
however, the suggestion that gay men must or should be domesticated is
both gendered and homophobic and implies that gay relationships should
look and operate very much like straight relationships.
This strategy is particularly clear in the campaign initiated by the Human
Rights Commission (HRC) generally titled “Family Matters” is the perfect
exemplification of this construction. Only recently dubbed “Family Matters,”
the campaign material spans over 12 years of the fight for gay marriage (hrc.
org). The campaign seeks to secure equal marriage benefits for civil unions.
The front of the brochure features two prominent pictures of families. A
family with two male parents with two children, as well as a family with two
female parents with one child is the dominating force of the brochure under a
bolded statement “OUR FAMILIES MATTER” (“Family Matters”, p. 1). The
text of the front of the advertisement argues for same-sex marriage benefits
for these families indicating their inability to access medical benefits for
their children, collect veterans’ family benefits, or family and medical leave
absences from their workplaces. This particular focus constructs <family> in
mirror image to the heterosexual construction of family replacing opposite
sexed partners with same sexed partners. The second page of the brochure is
lined at the bottom with photos of presumably gay and lesbian parents with
their children. These pictures only “read” gay because they appear in this
publication. If featured anywhere else, they would be indiscernible in terms
of sexuality. In this way, the argument positions gays and lesbians as “all
but heterosexual”—reinforcing their difference in an effort to gain access
to a mainstream institution.
An additional argument from expediency forwarded by the same sex
marriage movement is that lesbian relationships currently prove that same
sex relationships can function healthily as well as be monogamous. Flaks,
et al. (1995) reasoned that lesbian relationships are more often than not
characterized by “fidelity, responsibility, devotion, and a commitment to child
rearing” (p. 34). There are few if any statistics to make such a qualitative and
quantitative judgment of lesbian relationships. However, given contemporary
stereotypes about lesbians and women in particular, it seems safe to assume
that a household comprised of two women would operate predominately in a
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stereotypical feminine paradigm and as such childrearing and the like would
be true. The HRC again exemplifies this particular strategy one their website
(hrc.org) when discussing the benefits of civil unions. They feature the
story of the Andermills from Columbus, Ohio. Wrapped in Midwest values,
Dorie and Karen Andermill tell their story of becoming a loving nurturing
family. Their narrative is an exemplary model of a lesbian relationship.
While they have no children, they are both public service workers: a special
needs school teacher and an American Red Cross employee. Their 12-year
relationship represents a high functioning relationship on par with those of
heterosexuals, but is cloaked in the rhetoric of heteronormativity, subbing
a husband for a wife.
Ultimately, the position from which each movement can craft responses
to their opponents has thus far been in part foundationally reinforcing of
gendered stereotypes that contribute to their initial oppression. For women,
the demand and success of the suffrage movement can be attributed to
arguments that at once sought to advance the political power of women
but rests on social stereotypes of women. Similarly, the promotion of gay
marriage in national debates seems to be predicated on an emulation of
traditional heteronormative relationships—the basic components of which
gay and lesbian relationships cannot meet, and the ideological condition that
contributes to their oppression.
Notable Divergences
Overall, it is clear both from the arguments made against each movement
and their answers that these two movements share at their core arguments
from disadvantaged gendered positions. These similarities are exceptionally
important to acknowledge and understand; however, it is also in their
differences that important distinctions are found that impact the ability of
those in the gay marriage movement to borrow strategies from the suffrage
movement in the way of answering gendered indictments. Three primary
differences are relevant to the critical comparison made here: social positions,
agency, and nuance.
Initially, it is important to note that women as a social group at the time
of suffrage had a higher or at least a more solidified role in the social world.
Women’s necessity as a part of a moral and social order was not questioned.
Women were necessary because they maintained the family, they took care
of their husbands, they trained future statesmen, and they were the moral
compasses of a community. Gays and lesbians do not enjoy the same or even
similar social positioning. There is no presumed natural role for members of
the GLBT community in a society focused on productivity (both biologically
and materially). GLBT individuals cannot presume to make arguments that are
predicated on social utility. Their identity as individuals and as a movement
strips them of any social leverage that natural arguments (arguments from
expediency) require. This difference then, is an essential one. If members
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of the gay marriage movement seek to emulate gender-based responses it
is imperative that they find a social and political foundation where a basic
value is presumed—outside of justice based claims.
The second important difference between these two movements found
throughout the literature is the direction of agency within each movement.
As is evident in many of the arguments made above, in the suffrage debate
few arguments were made about how women would corrupt the structure of
the voting system or the government; instead, arguments were predominately
made that participation in that system would corrupt women. Women, here,
are the victims of corruption. However, in the case of the gay marriage debate,
members of the GLBT community are characterized as undermining the
institution of marriage. This argument seeks to characterize GLBT individuals
as predators as explained previously in my analysis. This dichotomy however,
highlights the double duty that is required of GLBT individuals in debates
concerning gay marriage. They must first defend their identity in the face
of homophobic claims about the personal behaviors of gays and lesbians,
and then can begin a reasonable discussion of marriage to prove that they
would not corrupt the institution itself. This puts gays and lesbians behind
before they even start the debate.
The final difference to be discussed here is that while both movements are
significantly and almost completely characterized by strict gender stereotypes
and assumptions, it seems that the arguments articulated against gay men
and lesbians in the way of gender are more nuanced and complicated. This
does not eliminate the capacity for GLBT individuals to borrow answers or
strategies from the suffrage movement, but it does complicate the nature
of those arguments and their viability as legitimate responses to the unique
gendered position of GLBT people. The double-bind that gay men face
means that either way they perform gender they are not normal men. Either
they are masculinity out of control, or they are drained of masculinity all
together. They are not able to represent, in terms of oppositional arguments,
normal male behavior.
Lesbians face a further gender predicament. Their intersectional identities
forsake them as political actors. Given the characterization of lesbians as
victims, and women as victims they are divested of nearly all personal agency.
Violence or persuasion happens to them to make them homosexual, and by
nature of being women they are made to be powerless, and dependent upon
men. This double-bind in both cases disadvantages both sexes and GLBT
individuals generally because they never begin debates on any level foundation.
This may also have broader implications in terms of how each sex can
articulate their specific rights to marriage. If each can not achieve normative
gender performance for variant reasons their capacity to make political and
legal arguments for the right marry are likely to diverge as well.
Implications and Conclusions
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While this critical comparison is by no means complete in scope or
content it can begin a discussion about the role of gender and genderbased arguments in social movements. The implications of this research
are both practical and theoretical. In terms of practice, this research shows
the similarities encountered in the way of gendered arguments in social
movement and public discourse. Emerging scholarship should take the time
to expand analysis of these two movements to see how these arguments
more intricately relate and draw out potential locations of similarities that
could benefit contemporary movement strategies, both rhetorically and
organizationally. For example, if women were able to successfully forward
arguments of expediency without too much damage done to negative images
of women, then members of the same gay marriage movement would be well
to find how this rhetoric worked to overcome dominant negative ideologies
surrounding suffrage. Further, suffragists were able to claim a certain level
of social responsibility for the appropriate working of the polity. Finding
similar ground in the gay marriage movement may be the foundation on
which national right to gay marriage may be won. Finally, a movement
strategy that has been emulated in the gay marriage debate is the state by
state securing of gay marriage rights, a strategy that was of service to the
suffrage movement. The strategic utility for rhetorical productions in this
respect is that they can be tailored to the particular voting electorate of the
state in question. The persuasive claims of the gay marriage movement,
then, can be particularized. However, history here is not all positive. It took
a national amendment to secure the rights of women to vote, the political
capital for which the gay marriage movement lacks. Finding and modeling
some of the national level messages of the suffrage movement may aid that
advancement of marriage equality in meaningful ways.
While this borrowing is terribly important, it is equally important to
understand the complicated nature of the gay marriage debate. The gay
marriage movement’s relationship to the institution to which it seeks entrance
is vitally different than that of suffragists. While women did not have to
defend or attack the fundamental qualities of the voting system or democracy
in general, because gay marriage is seen as threatening the sanctity of the
institution of marriage, the gay marriage movement faces the added burden
of deconstructing the iconic construction of marriage. Understanding the
ideographic nature of marriage makes the arguments from expediency
that much more important. Conservatives have securely held the ground
that describes marriage as a sacred religious institution that will only be
corrupted on account of gays and lesbians. Gay marriage proponents must
divorce marriage from its current flawless character, but must be careful in
doing so as to not negate its presumed benefits. The gay marriage movement
struggles in this respect. Conservative reaction to criticisms of the institution
of marriage is further protectionism of the institution itself. Commenting on
divorce rates as evidence of the slipping sanctity of marriage is met with
Kaleidoscope: Vol. 8, 2009: Kelsey

113

arguments about liberal excess. Ultimately, we find ourselves further shut
out of such institutions through such strategies.
On a more theoretical level the questions that this research raises are twofold: first, how can/should feminists and queers negotiate gender performance,
not just as normative, but as a moral requirement? Second, does critical gender
theory have a place in contemporary social movements concerning gender?
Initially, the analysis above and in the research concerning this topic highlighted
the religious nature of many arguments. For example, suffrage arguments
about the appropriate role of women were borne out of religious beliefs about
God’s role for women. In the gay marriage debate the argument is almost
completely religious—homosexuality is not natural, not part of God’s plan,
and an abominable sin. The only way to deduce many of these arguments is
that the failure to adequately perform the gender that you were assigned by
nature of your sex is immoral. Femininity and heterosexuality in this sense
become moral imperatives, not simply socially rewarding. Both Foucault
(1980) and Butler (1993) discuss social rewards in relation to expected social
performances. While Butler focuses primarily on gender performance, the
questions of power and social rewards are articulated clearly in Foucault’s
discussion of the state. What their conversation of gender performance and
social reward is missing is the moral expectation of such a performance. In this
way, those that do not perform their gender appropriately are not only socially
ostracized, but are religiously condemned—in religious exile with little hope of
reentrance. Expanding Butler’s discussions of gender performance and social
benefits to include an analysis of the construction of gender outlaws in relation
to claims of morality and sin would add to our more complete understanding
of gender, religion, and all of their intersections.
The second question: does critical gender theory have a place in
contemporary social movements concerning gender? The answer, of course,
is exceedingly complicated. While queer theory in general endures criticism
for its abstract nature, queer theorists who discuss gender performance in
particular are guilty of a disconnection from the material body. Specifically,
Butler makes the most complete arguments about gender performance in
relation to material reality; however, her work is difficult to apply to the
analysis here. While Butler’s Bodies that matter should ideally readily
apply to the question of gender performance given her analysis in “Paris
is Burning,” the actual politics of gender bending in political debates is
foundationally counterproductive. The religious and moral overtones, as
well as the control of heteronormative political institutions at the hands of
conservative men and women poses more than metatheoretical concerns for
members of the GLBT community who continue to be denied material rights.
To perform an alternative gender makes them immoral, not liberated in the
political realm, but to perform their “appropriate” gender and maintain their
identity is an impossibility. It seems that queer theory as a discipline has failed
to address this political quandary as it impacts the realities and daily lives
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of those involved in the gay marriage debate. As such, it is imperative that
theory meet praxis on this issue. Moving theory from academic institutions
to the “streets” of the movement would benefit both.
As members of the GLBT community we have much to learn from our
fore mothers in the suffrage movement. They faced the complicated gender
related arguments that we ward off daily in our seeking of the right to marry.
As members of this movement and leaders of more diverse and open society
that guarantees the natural rights of all people it is imperative that we take
cues from those who have come before and successfully fought for legislative
freedom, while simultaneously acknowledging that times and attitudes have
changed. We must be careful to know that our arguments must become
more nuanced, more directed, and more persuasive. Instead of making civil
rights-based arguments, we need to expand these to include social benefits
arguments. We must shift the debate away from the icon of marriage and
begin a conversation about how GLBT individuals can add to the benefits
of marriage. As academics we must be willing to translate our theoretical
positions into practical activism, and we must be unafraid to make practical
suggestions to improve the conditions of our realities. Without an effort in
this direction, the grounds of this debate and those that will take place in the
future concerning gender, gender performance and legislative/social/political
equality will always be lost.
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